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Abstract. The rich programming interfaces (APIs) provided by web
browsers can be diverted to collect a browser fingerprint. A small num-
ber of queries on these interfaces are sufficient to build a fingerprint that
is statistically unique and very stable over time. Consequently, the fin-
gerprint can be used to track users. Our work aims at mitigating the risk
of browser fingerprinting for users privacy by ‘breaking’ the stability of
a fingerprint over time. We add randomness in the computation of se-
lected browser functions, in order to have them deliver slightly different
answers for each browsing session. Randomization is possible thanks to
the following properties of browsers implementations: (i) some functions
have a nondeterministic specification, but a deterministic implementa-
tion; (ii) multimedia functions can be slightly altered without deterio-
rating user’s perception. We present FPRandom, a modified version of
Firefox that adds randomness to mitigate the most recent fingerprinting
algorithms, namely canvas fingerprinting, AudioContext fingerprinting
and the unmasking of browsers through the order of JavaScript prop-
erties. We evaluate the effectiveness of FPRandom by testing it against
known fingerprinting tests. We also conduct a user study and evaluate
the performance overhead of randomization to determine the impact on
the user experience.
1 Introduction
Browser fingerprinting has reached a state of maturity where it is now used by
many companies alongside cookies to identify and track devices for a wide range
of purposes from targeted advertising to fraud prevention. Several studies have
shown the growth of this technique along the years with both the discovery of
new attributes and its spread on the web [1,2,18]. Englehardt et al. notably
showed in 2016 that “the number of sites on which font fingerprinting is used
and the number of third parties using canvas fingerprinting have both increased
by considerably in the past few years” [8]. Third-parties are starting to turn to
the most recent browser APIs to collect as much device-specific information as
possible. Olejnik et al. demonstrated that recent APIs like the Battey API [20]
or the Ambient Light Sensor API [21] can leak device-specific information. En-
glehardt et al. discovered that some online scripts use the AudioContext API
to get data on the audio capabilities of a device [8]. However, in the fast evolv-
ing landscape of Web standards, only a very low number of works have explored
approaches to mitigate or thwart tracking through fingerprinting. The main chal-
lenge in designing a good defense is to preserve the user experience while sending
information that will render device identification impossible. Since most of the
different attributes that constitute a fingerprint are essential for browsing the
web, changing a single one incorrectly can result in the complete loss of func-
tionalities and the user is then unable to get access to the desired service. In
this paper, we explore the use of browsers’ flexibility to prevent tracking through
advanced fingerprinting techniques along with an implementation in a Firefox
browser called FPRandom.
Key insight Several API functions used to build a browser fingerprint are un-
necessarily deterministic and provide device-specific information as a side effect.
Browsers present untapped flexibility that can be exploited to obtain a con-
stantly changing fingerprint. We especially investigate the two following areas:
– Browsers’ JavaScript engines make deterministic implementation choices,
even for some functions which are meant to be non-deterministic according
to the ECMAScript. We show that by removing some of these deterministic
coding choices, we can prevent the leakage of device-specific information.
– Randomness can be used to diversify how HTML multimedia elements are
rendered in the browser. Leveraging human’s perception of colors and sound,
we introduce controlled noise into the rendering process of canvas and audio
elements. Consequently, fingerprinting scripts constantly collect new values,
but we preserve the user experience.
By introducing randomness into key browser subroutines, we break the stabil-
ity of a fingerprint without artificially replacing values with pre-existing ones.
This hampers user tracking since a server cannot rely on the stability of the
fingerprint.
Implementation and Evaluation The landscape of browser fingerprinting
has greatly evolved in the past few years with the push of HTML5 by devel-
opers to make the web more secure and more complete. The lists of plugins
and fonts used to be two key attributes to identify devices, but they are now
slowly becoming remnants of the past. Yet, more recent techniques such as can-
vas fingerprinting [1], AudioContext fingerprinting [8] and the unmasking of the
browser through JavaScript properties’ order [18] offer strong foundations for
effective fingerprinting. Our work focuses on these three techniques. For each
technique, we look at the official JavaScript specification with a special atten-
tion for the inner-workings of the targeted HTML elements. Then we design
behavioural modifications that can impact the fingerprinting process without
altering the user experience. We developed a working prototype based on Fire-
fox called FPRandom and we evaluate both its performance and its resilience
against known fingerprinting scripts. The performed benchmarks show that the
overhead introduced by our solution is negligible and that all scripts using the
targeted attributes are affected.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of our approach
along with details on existing techniques to break the linkability of fingerprints.
Section 3 details the FPRandom browser with the different fingerprinting tech-
niques we target. Section 4 provides an evaluation of the browser’s performance
and its ability to deceive known fingerprinting scripts. Section 5 discusses the
related work while Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Breaking linkability of fingerprints
Fingerprint uniqueness and stability are the two key properties that make browser
fingerprint tracking a reality. In this work, we aim at breaking the stability of
fingerprints so that collected fingerprints are not linkable. Diversity is a strong
solution as constantly-changing information can be sent to fingerprinters without
impacting the user experience. Below, we present two state of the art solutions
that specifically target the linkability of fingerprints before we detail our ap-
proach.
2.1 Current solutions
Blink In a previous study, we explored with Blink the use of dynamic software
reconfiguration “to establish a moving target defense against browser fingerprint
tracking” [13]. By leveraging virtualization and assembling components from a
large pool of operating systems, browsers, plugins and fonts, Blink is able to
build environments that exhibit very different fingerprints over time. The strong
advantage of this solution is that the generated browsing platforms are genuine:
they do not present any inconsistencies contrary to the spoofing extensions dis-
cussed in Section 5. However, its major drawback is the complete machinery
involved in the synthesis of these browsing platforms. To exhibit diverse fin-
gerprints, Blink relies on a pool of hundreds of components that can occupy a
large amount of disk space and the use of virtual machines can be very costly
on less powerful computers. Moreover, Blink requires the use of several differ-
ent browsers to increase its success rate at breaking fingerprint linkability. It
is a sacrifice that not all users may be willing to make to increase their online
privacy.
PriVaricator Nikiforakis et al. explore with PriVaricator how randomization
can be used to render browser fingerprints unreliable for tracking [18]. The main
insight of their study is that making fingerprints non-deterministic on multi-
ple visits makes them hard to link across browsing sessions. They state that
“creatively misrepresenting or lying about [collected] values introduces an el-
ement of non-determinism” and that “subtly misrepresenting key properties of
the browser environment goes a long way towards combating fingerprinters”. As
a proof of concept, they introduced into Chromium the concept of randomiza-
tion policies, protection strategies that are activated when specific requirements
are met. They designed policies against the collection of offset measurements of
HTML elements and the enumeration of the list of plugins.
2.2 Our approach: exploiting browsers’ flexibility
In this work, we propose to exploit browsers’ untapped flexibility to introduce
randomness. Instead of changing software components at runtime like Blink or
lying on specific values like PriVaricator, we want to increase non-determinism
in browsers to reduce side-effects that cause fingerprintable behaviors.
Flexibility of the implementation of the JavaScript specifications The
official ECMAScript specification, the de facto standard for scripting language
on the web, allows some flexibility in actual JavaScript implementations. Differ-
ent parts of the specification give some leeway by clearly indicating that specific
choices are left for the implementation. The ECMA organization strictly codifies
the interpretation of the language but the exact details of how it works remain in
the hands of browser vendors. For example, as we will see in the next Section, the
enumeration order of JavaScript properties are not detailed by the ECMAScript
specification but each browser presents its own unique order. Developers have
made deterministic choices when they implemented these functions. By taking a
step back and removing what can be interpreted as a surspecification of the stan-
dard, we are able to thwart fingerprinting vectors that rely on these detectable
side-effects.
Flexibility of the renderings of multimedia elements Vendors are con-
stantly striving to improve their browsers to provide the latest innovations and
the best possible experience to their users. Changing some attributes collected
in a browser fingerprint like the user agent or the screen resolution can nega-
tively impact how a page is displayed to the detriment of users. However, the
rendering of HTML multimedia elements can be made more flexible and less
deterministic without degrading the user experience. Especially, we can exploit
users’ perception of color and sound to introduce imperceptible noise that im-
pacts the stability of specific browser routines. The key challenge here is to apply
very small modifications that no user will notice while a fingerprinting script will
output constantly changing values at every execution.
3 Implementation
To experiment with randomization, we target three of the most recent finger-
printing techniques: canvas fingerprinting as it is a prime example of a dynamic
media element and “in the top 5 of the most discriminating attributes” [14];
the Web Audio API recently observed in fingerprinting scripts by Englehardt et
al. [8]; the leakage of system information through JavaScript properties’ order
found by Nikiforakis et al. in the Cookieless Montster study [18]. All the miti-
gation techniques detailed in this section are implemented in a modified version
of Firefox called FPRandom. The complete patch for Firefox 54 is available on
GitHub 4 along with a fully-compiled prototype for Linux systems.
3.1 Canvas API
Definition Canvas fingerprinting was firstly introduced by Mowery et al. [16]
and observed on the Internet by Acar et al. [1]. Its goal is to use the Canvas API
of a browser to draw an image that can help differentiate one device from another.
Each device executes the exact same set of instructions and depending on both
hardware and software, rendered images present variations. Figure 1 shows the
canvas test we run on the AmIUnique website. The test consists in displaying
two lines of text with different shapes merged together. Here, depending on the
hardware and the installed drivers, the rendering of shapes and colors slightly
vary between devices. Then, depending on the software and most especially on
the list of installed fonts, the lines of text can present great differences. In our
previous study [14], we showed that one of the strength of canvas fingerprinting
is its stability and that it is “in the top 5 of the most discriminating attributes”.
It is notably the “second highest source of entropy for mobile devices”.
Modification The first modification we made to the Firefox source code is to
introduce randomness inside the ParseColor function of the CanvasRendering-
Context2D class. Every time a color is set inside a canvas fingerprinting script,
the browser changes the actual RGB values of the parsed color by adding or
removing a very small number for each color channel. For example, if a script
asks to draw an orange rectangle, the browser will paint the canvas element as
requested. However, for every browsing session, the browser will use a slightly
different orange than the last time. Modifying the ParseColor method enables us
to support the full range of color declaration (for example, you can chose a color
by directly setting its RGB values or you can simply write its name like “gold” or
“orange”). The impact on the user experience is almost non-existent as the dif-
ference in color is very hard to see with the naked eye. Finally, it should be noted
that we differentiate ourselves from tools called “canvas poisoners” that change
the RGB values of each pixel of the rendered image independently from one an-
other. Mowery et al. wrote that they are not “a feasible defense” against current
scripts because the noise can be lifted by repeating a test a few times and com-
paring the results. They add that the aggressive introduction of noise “degrades
the performance of <canvas> significantly for legitimate applications”[16]. With
our approach, the color on a whole surface is consistent as we do not introduce
random noise on separate pixels. As discussed in Section 3.4, we can apply the
exact same modification for every run of a fingerprinting script. If a fingerprinter
were to repeat the same canvas test more than once, he will not be able to no-
tice differences whereas canvas poisoners present noticeable variations between
runs. The second modification operates in the SetFont function of the Canvas-
RenderingContext2D class and changes a font set by a script by one present on
4 https://github.com/plaperdr/fprandom
the operating system. For the scripts asking for a fallback font, the stability is
broken as a font different from the previous session will be presented.
Example Figure 2 illustrates the impact of FPRandom on the exact same can-
vas test with all protection features enabled. The blue, orange and green colors
are slightly different for each run and the used fonts are chosen among the ones
present on the operating system. The more fonts are installed on the user’s sys-
tem, the bigger the diversity of generated canvas renderings will be. By changing
at runtime core properties of elements present in a canvas test, we break the sta-
bility of this technique while still preserving the user experience.
Fig. 1: Original canvas rendering with
standard colors and the default fall-
back font
Fig. 2: Canvas renderings with modi-
fied colors and fonts
3.2 AudioContext API
Definition Discovered by Englehardt et al. while crawling the web looking
for trackers [8], AudioContext fingerprinting is a newcomer in the browser fin-
gerprinting domain. The AudioContext API provides an interface to create a
pipeline to process audio. By linking audio modules together, you can generate
audio signals and apply very specific operations like compression or filtering to
generate a very specific output.
In audio, sampling is applied to convert a continuous signal into a discrete
one. This way, a computer can easily process audio in distinct blocks called
frames. Each frame is composed of samples that represent the value of the audio
stream at a specific point in time. Englehardt et al. have shown that, depending
on the audio stack of your system (both software and hardware), the exact value
of each of these frames slightly vary between devices. An audio fingerprint can
then be created similarly to what is done with the Canvas API.
Modification We performed an analysis of audio fingerprints that we collected
on AmIUnique.org and the results can be found in Appendix A. We decided
to introduce very small noises directly into the audio processing routines of
the browser so that tests using any number of AudioContext modules are all
impacted. We operate at the heart of the AudioBuffers of the AudioNodeEngine
as they contain the frames of the processed audio. By modifying key functions,
we slightly decrease the volume of processed buffers by a factor ranging between
0.000 and 0.001. This way, a frame can present very small variations where only
the smallest decimal digits are affected. With the use of very small factors, it is
impossible to detect modified sections from unmodified ones just by listening to
the rendered track as the differences between the original and modified track can
genuinely be interpreted as side effects or simple noise of the whole audio stack
of the device. For fingerprinting scripts, these modifications produce a different
hash as the audio routine will be ever so slightly different for each browsing
session.
Example Figure 3 shows three waveforms of the first second of the “Ride of the
Valkyries” from Wagner. The audio pipeline we set up for this example performs
two operations. It first increases the volume of the track with a GainNode and
then compresses it through a DynamicsCompressorNode. The waveform in Fig-
ure 3a represents the output from an unaltered pipeline and the one in Figure 3b
from a pipeline with our volume modification. The last waveform in Figure 3c
represents the difference between the first two (i.e. the introduced noise). In
order to see the impact of FPRandom, the 3rd waveform has been zoomed in
at 1000%. The scale is a clear indication that the generated noise is inaudible,
proving that the impact on the user experience is non-existent audio wise but it
still impacts the created audio fingerprint.
(a) Original waveform (b) Modified waveform
(c) Difference between the two
waveforms
Fig. 3: Visualization of audio rendered through the AudioContext API
3.3 Order of JavaScript object’s properties
Definition By analyzing the content of JavaScript objects in the browser,
Nikiforakis et al. discovered that “the order of property-enumeration of special
browser objects, like the navigator and screen objects, is consistently different
between browser families, versions of each browser, and, in some cases, among
deployments of the same version on different operating systems”[18]. This way, if
someone were to hide the true browser’s identity, enumerating the properties of a
special object would simply unmask it. As stated by the latest ECMAScript Lan-
guage Specification ratified in June 2016, “mechanics and order of enumerating
the properties is not specified” (see section 13.7.5.15 EnumerateObjectProperties
of [7]). This ordering behavior is entirely dependent on the browser’s implemen-
tation. Chrome and Firefox yield vastly different enumeration orders for native
objects like navigator. For non-native JavaScript objects, both browsers first re-
turn integers in ascending order and then strings in insertion order. This choice
is arbitrary and many developers have long debated for the best and most logical
behavior as illustrated by this long discussion on the V8 bug tracker[22].
Modification The browser’s unmasking added by the surspecification of the
ECMAScript standard can simply be undone by modifying the jsiter class of
Firefox. A special flag called “JS MORE DETERMINISTIC” can be activated
at compile time to sort IDs for both native and non-native objects in a deter-
ministic way. By tweaking the behavior of the SortComparatorIds structure used
with this special flag, we flip its purpose by not making the JavaScript engine
more deterministic but by generating a unique enumeration order every time the
browser is launched.
With the “JS MORE DETERMINISTIC” flag activated, the enumeration of
a JavaScript object first returns integers in ascending order and then strings in
alphabetical order. By diving even deeper into the source code, we found that
the string comparison done by the browser relies on the “Latin-1” or “ISO/CEI
8859-1” encoding of each string. When comparing two strings, the engine goes
through one character at a time and performs a simple subtraction of their code
points (i.e. their place in the Latin-1 character set, see [27]) to determine which
character is in front of the other. When a difference is detected, the engine
knows how to order the two strings as the result is either positive or negative.
Appendix B gives an example of such comparison between the appName and
appVersion strings.
In order to change the enumeration order for each browsing session, we assign
a random order for each combination (i.e. for each possible subtraction result)
from the Latin-1 character set. As the first code point starts at position no32
and the last one is at no255, we generate in total 223 different booleans to cover
all possible combinations. Any attempt to unmask the browser through this
technique is then prevented.
3.4 Randomization strategy
All the modifications described in this section can be executed in different ways
when browsing the web. Here, we detail the two randomization strategies present
in FPRandom while discussing their own strengths and weaknesses.
Random mode The first mode that we propose in FPRandom is the “Random”
strategy. Every time the modified functions are executed in the browser, they will
return random values. The advantage is that it prevents cross-domain tracking as
two scripts on two different domains (even from the same provider) would collect
different values on both sites. However, the major downside of this solution
is that it presents “transparency” problems as discussed by Nikiforakis et al.
in the PriVaricator study. [17]. If a fingerprinter were to study the presence
of randomness, a script could execute the same test several times to detect
instability. Depending on the test, a statistical analysis could be performed to
reduce or remove the introduced randomness but it requires far more means and
a certain insight into the way noise is introduced to get meaningful results. The
“Random” mode is the default one in FPRandom as we have no recorded proof
of such behaviors from today’s major fingerprinting actors.
Per session The second mode initializes all the randomized variables at startup
and they are never modified on subsequent executions. The advantages of this
strategy is that it cannot be detected through repeated measurements as the
browser will always return the same answers for an identical fingerprinting test.
The downside is that it only breaks linkability between browsing sessions as the
same fingerprint will be presented to all websites until the browser is rebooted.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Deceiving fingerprinting scripts
As pointed out by [17], while it is possible to analyze the JavaScript code that
runs inside the browser and detect fingerprinting scripts, it is much more compli-
cated to find fingerprinters that can act as black-box oracles for our work. Some
websites give a specific identifier associated with a device’s fingerprint but others
map collected attributes in a very specific way that is confidential and that is
entirely performed on the side of the server. The main challenge in assessing
the impact of FPRandom is to find fingerprinting scripts that use the advanced
techniques we target and retrieve the right information (either an identifier or
the fingerprint data that is sent).
Fingerprintjs2 is the second version of a popular open-source fingerprinting li-
brary that collects 25 different attributes and hash them all into a single value [9].
We executed the complete test suite of this library 100 times on both a standard
version of Firefox 54 and FPRandom. On Firefox 54, we obtained the same hash
for all of the 100 executions. For FPRandom, we collected 100 different ones with
the Random mode and a single one in Session mode. These results show how
fragile the test suite is for identification. The introduction of noise on a single
attribute is sufficient to be considered as a “new” fingerprint.
Maxmind is a company specialized in IP geolocation and online fraud preven-
tion. As part of its fraud detection system, Maxmind has a “device tracking
add-on” to identify devices “as they move across networks” [15]. The main add-
on script sends the complete device fingerprint at a specific address in a POST
request. We manually analyzed the code of the add-on and found that it col-
lects the rendering of a canvas test along with the enumeration order of both the
navigator and screen objects. After 100 runs of the fingerprinting script, FPRan-
dom gives a different canvas hash at each execution whereas a standard Firefox
build always send the same result. For the enumeration orders, the behavior
of Firefox 54 is the expected one and returns the exact same order for both
JavaScript objects. For FPRandom, the browser gives a unique and different
enumeration order at each session.
Limitations Our approach does not deal with static attributes like the user-
agent or the timezone but it can mitigate the collection of dynamic attributes
from APIs like Canvas or Battery. Scripts that do not rely on the attributes we
target can still build their own browser fingerprint and use it for tracking, albeit
with a less complete view of the user’s system.
4.2 Performance
We use three different JavaScript benchmark suites to assess the performance
overhead introduced by FPRandom. The experiments were conducted on a lap-
top running Fedora 25 with an Intel Core i7-4600U CPU @ 2.10GHz. The tests
were performed using Firefox 54 (Nightly version) with and without our modi-
fications present and enabled.
Firefox Random Session
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
Browser
T
im
e 
to
 g
en
er
at
e 
a 
ca
nv
as
 r
en
de
rin
g 
(m
s)
(a) Canvas API
Firefox Random Session
13
00
0
14
00
0
15
00
0
16
00
0
17
00
0
Browser
D
ur
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
be
nc
hm
ar
k 
(m
s)
(b) Audio API
Fig. 4: Benchmarking results
Canvas As there are no benchmarks that specifically target the Canvas API, we
developed our own test to asses the overhead introduced by our color and font
variations. We repeated the test shown in Figure 1 1,000 times and measured
the time it takes for each image to be fully rendered inside the browser. To get
precise measurements, we used the JavaScript Performance API that provides
timestamps with an accuracy up to the microsecond [23]. Figure 4a illustrates
the difference between a vanilla version of Firefox 54 and FPRandom. While an
unmodified version takes 0.12ms to render the image, our modified browser is
about 0.06ms longer on average in both randomization modes. This difference
corresponds to the time it takes to properly choose a new font and introduce
variations in the canvas colors. With these reported numbers, we consider the
overhead here to be negligible as a rendering time of less than a single millisecond
will not impact the user experience.
AudioContext To assess the impact of FPRandom on the AudioContext API,
we use a WebAudio benchmark developed by a Mozilla developer [4]. The bench-
mark performs a series of 19 different tests from simple gain operations to more
complex mixing procedures. Each test instantiates an OfflineAudioContext ob-
ject which is one of the objects we targeted when modifying the Firefox source
code. The results in Figure 4b indicate the time it takes to perform the complete
series of 19 tests. It should be noted that we repeated the test suite 30 times.
The mean value for FPRandom is about 25% higher than its Firefox counter-
part. The “Random” mode is also a little longer than the “Session” one. This
increase can be explained by the fact that the modified code is executed a very
high number of times in a single test. By comparison, the modification made to
the canvas API is only executed once for a test. We instrumented the browser
to find a precise number and we found out that a single run of the benchmark
enters our modified function more than 8,862,000 times. As a point of reference,
the AudioContext test found by Englehardt et al.[8] only enters our function less
than 3,000 times. With these numbers, we qualify the benchmark as extremely
intensive. The increase in processing time may not be visible for less extreme
and more traditional uses of the API. We leave for a future work the exploration
of different implementation strategies where only a specific percentage of audio
frames would be modified, leading to an increase in performance.
JavaScript enumeration order As a final performance test for FPRandom,
we decided to run a standard JavaScript benchmark to see if the modification
made on the enumeration order has an impact on the overall JavaScript engine.
We used the recent JetStream benchmark[12] which is developed as part of the
WebKit browser engine. Currently, the 1.1 version performs 39 different tests
and covers a wide variety of advanced workloads and programming techniques.
It integrates tests from well-known benchmarking suites like SunSpider or Octane
along with new ones developed specifically for JetStream (more details [11]). The
Table 1: JetStream benchmark results
Firefox FPRandom-Random FPRandom-Session
Latency 76.075 ± 1.3250 74.553 ± 1.8074 74.767 ± 1.2530
Throughput 251.97 ± 3.2912 252.32 ± 2.4214 256.02 ± 1.1213
Total 147.45 ± 1.5753 146.23 ± 1.9204 147.61 ± 1.1257
results are present in Table 1 (the bigger the score, the better the performance).
As we can see, the scores are almost identical and no real distinction can be
made between Firefox and FPRandom. The behavior of the two browsers are
similar on both JavaScript throughput and latency and the impact of our order
modification is seemingly nonexistent.
Web crawl In order to assess more globally the impact of our modifications
on day-to-day browsing, we crawled the thousand most popular websites as re-
ported by Alexa [3] on both a vanilla version of Firefox 54 and FPRandom. We
used Selenium as the engine for the crawl of both browsers, and we used the
Performance API of the browser to measure the time it takes for the DOM of
the main page to be completely loaded. Specifically, we used the domLoading
and domContentLoadedEventStart events to make our measurements as they
are independent of problems related to network instabilities and congestion. Be-
cause of server unavailability and certificate problems encountered during our
crawl, we miss loading times for 43 sites. The results can be found in Table 2.
In general, load times are extremely close between a vanilla Firefox and FPRan-
dom. Mean times indicate a slightly better performance for Firefox. Yet, in both
cases, the standard deviation is very high, meaning that the collected loading
times are very dispersed between 0 and 5s. These numbers demonstrate that the
modifications introduced in FPRandom do not have a visible impact on the user
experience for day-to-day browsing. Moreover, we can also say that the amount
of site breakage is kept to a minimum as only a single script provided us with
an error due to our enumeration modification. The modifications on both the
Canvas and AudioContext API had no impact on site breakage.
Table 2: Web crawl results
Times collected Min (ms) Max (ms) Mean (ms) SD (ms)
Firefox 957 10 64728 1602 3712
FPRandom 958 9 55852 1823 3935
4.3 User study
An important aspect of FPRandom is that it modifies multimedia elements that
can be seen or heard by the user. To make sure that the modified subroutines
do not degrade substantially the user experience at the cost of better privacy,
we ran a preliminary user study in February 2017. Its goal was to compare
multimedia elements as rendered by a normal version of Firefox 54 with modified
ones rendered by FPRandom. The study was divided into two phases: the first
was focused on the modifications made to canvas elements while the second
investigated the impact on the AudioContext API. The link to our survey was
communicated through regular channels like social networks and team mailing
lists. We received an answer from 20 participants and the results are as follows:
– Half of them noticed a color difference between the original canvas rendering
and the 10 modified ones, the other half did not.
– 70% said that some fonts made the strings harder to read and only one person
said that it was significantly harder for all of the modified renderings.
– For the AudioContext API, only 25% detected a difference between the orig-
inal track and the 3 modified ones.
– For people who heard a difference, they all qualified the difference with words
like “tiny” or “small”.
These results give us confidence in the direction we took with our approach but
we plan on conducting a more thorough study to pinpoint more precisely avenues
for improvement with more participants. Still, we will investigate how we can
exclude some exotic fonts as they can make strings in canvas renderings harder
to read for users.
5 Related work
While we focus in this paper on breaking the linkability of browser fingerprints,
other approaches have been designed to tackle fingerprint tracking.
Blocking extensions Several works report that one strong way to prevent
tracking is to block scripts before they are loaded by the browser [1,8,16].
Browser extensions like NoScript[19], Ghostery[10] or Disconnect[6] are illus-
trations of such solutions. However, these extensions require complete lists of
all scripts performing fingerprinting to correctly block them. As the web is con-
stantly evolving and actors in the tracking business are changing, it is very hard
to maintain up-to-date lists to protect users’ privacy.
Spoofing extensions Another way to mitigate tracking based on browser fin-
gerprints is to return incorrect information to trackers. Dozens of spoofing exten-
sions already exist for both Chrome and Firefox. With very few steps, a Firefox
browser can easily report that it is a Chrome one and vice versa. However, as
shown by Nikiforakis et al. [18], these solutions produce inconsistent fingerprints.
While the user agent reports one information, a JavaScript property will tell a
different story, proving that the browser has deliberately changed its default val-
ues. Torres et al. follow in the footsteps of spoofers and created a solution called
FP-Block that is an implementation of the concept of separation of web identi-
ties [25]. The idea is simple: FP-Block generates a fingerprint (i.e. an identity)
for each website that the browser is in contact with. Every time the browser
reconnects to the same website, it will reuse the generated identity. As a defense
against fingerprinting, the premise is great but unfortunately, the implementa-
tion presents the same shortcomings as the extensions stated above. Generated
fingerprints are inconsistent and it is easy to find supposedly hidden information
as there is an incomplete coverage of methods used for fingerprinting.
Use of multiple browsers One approach to obtain different browser finger-
prints is to use multiple browsers. However, Boda et al. showed the existence of
Cross-browser fingerprinting [5]. By collecting enough OS-specific data like the
list of fonts or plugins, a script can identify a device behind multiple browsers
as these information are stable from one browser to the next. A more recent
method by Cao et al. can identify with high precision users across different
browsers through the use of the WebGL API [28].
Tor browser The Tor browser is a modified Firefox specifically designed for the
Tor network. Its approach towards fingerprinting is to have fingerprints that are
as uniform as possible. As stated by the Tor design document [24], its defenses
include “value spoofing”, “Subsystem Modification or Reimplementation”, “Vir-
tualization”, “Site Permissions” and “Feature or Functionality Removal”. How-
ever, this approach poses several problems. First, by design, fingerprints from Tor
browser are very specific and thus already known to trackers. Its users can easily
be identified as using the Tor browser. Then, the offered protection is extremely
brittle since a simple change can change the standard fingerprint to a unique one.
To remain effective, customizability and personalization are severely hampered
because of this mono-configuration. Finally, by blocking specific browser APIs,
the Tor browser restricts users from benefiting from the full array of browser
features that could enrich their browsing experience.
6 Conclusion and future perspectives
In this work, we aim at breaking the stability of browser fingerprints over time
to improve users’ privacy. By identifying APIs with restrictive implementation
with respect to the JavaScript specification, we introduce randomness to produce
slight variations at each execution of a fingerprinting script. We also generate
noise inside HTML multimedia elements to alter their rendering without deteri-
orating user’s perception. The approach presented in this work can be general-
ized to more fingerprinting vectors. For example, there exists other parts in the
ECMAScript specification that leave the exact details of the implementation in
the hands of developers. The use of Math constants in the browser can be used
to unveil information about the device and its browser [26]. If we take a look
at Section 20.2.2. of the official JavaScript specification [7], it is written that
“the choice of algorithms is left to the implementation” and that the behavior of
mathematical functions “is not precisely specified”. This means that the actual
libraries used for these functions could be diversified to prevent the unmasking
of the operating system. In the end, the main challenge that remains here is
to perform an exhaustive search to identify and anticipate future fingerprinting
mechanisms. By locating key functions that could reveal device-specific informa-
tion, we could preemptively introduce randomness to reinforce users’ privacy on
the web.
We also developed a working prototype called FPRandom that targets the
following attributes of the browser fingerprinting domain: canvas fingerprinting,
AudioContext fingerprinting and the unmasking of the browser through the or-
der of special JavaScript objects. By looking at the specification and analyzing
the browser’s source code, we modified key locations to introduce very small
noise that prevents the use of these fingerprinting vectors for identification. Our
tests show that our modifications impact known fingerprinting scripts that use
the targeted attributes. A careful attention was also given to preserve the user
experience as much as possible and our performance benchmarks indicate that
the introduced overhead is very small.
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A Analyzing differences in the AudioContext API
In order to have a better understanding of the diversity of audio fingerprints on
the web, we deployed the AudioContext script found by Englehardt et al. on
the AmIUnique.org website (used in our Beauty and the Beast study[14]). After
discarding more than 1,000 fingerprints from browsers that did not implement
the AudioContext API, we collected in total 19,468 audio fingerprints on a period
of 100 days between June and September 2016. The results of this study can be
found in Table 3. We use the Shannon entropy in bits to better represent the
probability distribution of each of the attributes. The higher the entropy is, the
more diversity is exhibited between devices.
Table 3: Study of 19,468 audio fingerprints
Name
Entropy
(bits)
Size of the
biggest set
Number of
distinct values
Number of
unique values
acSampleRate 1.18 9549 10 3
acState 0.99 10821 2 0
acMaxChannelCount 0.38 18580 11 1
acNumberOfInputs 0.0 19468 1 0
acNumberOfOutputs 0.0 19468 1 0
acChannelCount 0.0 19468 1 0
acChannelCountMode 0.0 19468 1 0
acChannelInterpretation 0.0 19468 1 0
anFftSize 0.0 19468 1 0
anFrequencyBinCount 0.0 19468 1 0
anMinDecibels 0.0 19468 1 0
anMaxDecibels 0.0 19468 1 0
anSmoothingTimeConstant 0.0 19468 1 0
anNumberOfInputs 0.0 19468 1 0
anNumberOfOutputs 0.0 19468 1 0
anChannelCount 0.99 10821 2 0
anChannelCountMode 0.0 19468 1 0
anChannelInterpretation 0.0 19468 1 0
audioDynSum 3.28 5698 53 5
audioDynHash 3.43 5697 72 12
Most of the collected attributes have a single value and do not provide any
ground to distinguish one device from another. From the collected audio finger-
prints, only 3 attributes have an entropy superior to a single bit:
– acSampleRate is the default sample rate of a created track when using the
AudioContext API. The most common values are 44,1kHz (49,0% of col-
lected fingerprints) and 48kHz (48,5%) but some browsers still present some
unusual ones (1,7% have 192kHz and 0,7% 96kHz).
– audioDynSum is the sum of 500 frames generated by a very specific audio
processing (compressed audio from an oscillator). The precision of each frame
is up to 15 decimal digits. The large majority of values are really close to
each other with differences only appearing from the 6th or 7th decimal digit.
– audioDynHash is similar to audioDynSum as it takes the exact same output
but it covers the entirety of the rendered track instead of a few hundreds
frames. As it covers a larger space, the entropy is a little higher and this test
exhibits more diversity than all other collected attributes.
With these results, we decided to focus only on the differences created by the
audio processing performed inside audio nodes. Especially, we want to introduce
random noise in the computed frames so that each run of the same test produces
different variations. Other values like the default sample rate are still interesting
to change but they can easily be modified and they are not the focus of this
work.
B Example of string comparison when ordering
JavaScript properties
Figure 5 illustrates the comparison mechanism between the appVersion and the
appName strings. The engine starts with the ‘a’ letter on both strings. Trans-
lating this letter to their corresponding Latin-1 code points yields the decimal
numbers ‘97’. Subtracting 97 from 97 results in 0. As no difference is detected,
the engine continues but faces the exact same result for both the second and
third characters in each string as they are identical ‘p’ letters. However, the be-
havior is different from the fourth character. The first string presents a ‘V’ and
the second an ‘N’. Translating to their decimal code points yields ‘86’ and ‘78’.
This time, since the subtraction 86− 78 = 8 does not give a zero, it informs the
engine that a difference has been detected. As the result is positive, appName is
placed before appVersion. If the result of the subtraction were to be negative, it
would have been the opposite order.
a p p V e r s i o n
a p p N a m e
1
‘a’ 
‘a’
‘p’
‘p’                          
‘V’
‘N’
Character
Latin-1
Code point Result
0
0
8
97
97
112
112
86
78
2 3
4
appVersion > 
appName
1 2 3 4
Fig. 5: String comparison between the appName and appVersion properties
